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Abstract
Differential testing to solve the oracle problem has been applied in
many scenarios where multiple supposedly equivalent implementations
exist, such as multiple implementations of a C compiler. If the multiple
systems disagree on the output for a given test input, we have likely dis-
covered a bug without every having to specify what the expected output
is. Research on variational analyses (or variability-aware or family-based
analyses) can benefit from similar ideas. The goal of most variational
analyses is to perform an analysis, such as type checking or model check-
ing, over a large number of configurations much faster than an existing
traditional analysis could by analyzing each configuration separately. Vari-
ational analyses are very suitable for differential testing, since the existence
nonvariational analysis can provide the oracle for test cases that would
otherwise be tedious or difficult to write. In this experience paper, I report
how differential testing has helped in developing KConfigReader, a tool for
translating the Linux kernel’s kconfig model into a propositional formula.
Differential testing allows us to quickly build a large test base and incor-
porate external tests that avoided many regressions during development
and made KConfigReader likely the most precise kconfig extraction tool
available.
1 Introduction
Over the years, my collaborators and I have built many different analysis tools for
highly-configurable software systems, including CIDE [Kästner and Apel, 2008],
TypeChef [Kästner et al., 2011, 2012b; Liebig et al., 2013], and Varex* [Meinicke
et al., 2016; Nguyen et al., 2014]. Those tools were designed to perform compli-
cated analyses at scale on real languages, be it Java, C, or PHP. Getting them
right required to be precise about language semantics and the variability mecha-
nisms that we analyzed. We spent a lot of time testing our implementations on
small and large examples. But over time our quality assurance strategy changed,
adopting more and more the idea of differential testing for configurable systems.
In this paper, I share my experience of systematically using differential testing
while building KConfigReader in 2014, which was pivotal for me and led me
to strongly advocate differential testing in all subsequent projects. I hope this
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experience might convince others to adopt similar quality assurance strategies in
their work as well.
KConfigReader is a tool to read the Linux kernel’s variability model (kconfig
files) and translate it into a propositional formula for automated reasoning with
SAT solvers. It is similar to prior tools in LVAT [She and Berger, 2010; She
et al., 2010] and Undertaker [Tartler et al., 2009, 2011] which did all the heavy
lifting in understanding the kconfig semantics and pioneering such translation. I
needed such a tool for analyzing the Linux kernel for type and linker errors with
TypeChef, to report only errors that were not already excluded by the variability
model. Although we originally used LVAT in TypeChef, it had known bugs
and limitations and was no longer maintained, and Undertaker’s infrastructure
was not designed for the accuracy needed in TypeChef. In the spring of 2014, I
(naively) decided to write my own tool, aiming for maximum precision in the
translation from kconfig into propositional formula.
KConfigReader was the first project in which I consequently used differential
testing from the very beginning. For a test case with 10 boolean options, there
are only 1024 potential configurations—a number small enough to perform some
computation on each configuration separately. Using small test cases with less
than 10 options, I ran the original kconfig program on all possible configurations
of each test to get a ground truth about which configurations were valid, without
having to specify the oracle myself. This allowed me to quickly write test cases
even for corner cases, to explore unusual constructs, and to build a regression
test suite that would catch mistakes introduced when addressing other corner
cases. Differential testing was essential to implementing accurate transformations
and helped make KConfigReader likely the most accurate tool of its kind, as
recently also confirmed in an independent study by El-Sharkawy et al. [2015].
In this paper, I want to share my experience with differential testing in
the context of variational analyses. I learned that differential testing is an
ideal match for testing variational analyses, that setting up a differential-testing
infrastructure is usually fairly simple, and that once set up it drastically simplifies
and encourages writing tests. I have used differential testing on several other
projects since, and even used it to create tests for earlier projects. While the
idea is not new, I think it is severely underappreciated in our community and I
believe that many other researchers and practitioners could benefit from it.
2 Differential Testing for Variational Analyses
My first conscientious exposure to differential testing was Yang et al.’s PLDI
2011 paper “Finding and Understanding Bugs in C Compilers” on CSmith [Yang
et al., 2011]. The authors developed an infrastructure to generate random C
code snippets to test the optimization phase in compilers. Since it is difficult to
predict the expected correct output for a randomly generated code fragment,
they used the simple idea of compiling the code with multiple compilers. If the
programs compiled with different compilers from the same source code behave
differently, there is likely a bug in at least one compiler. In Figure 1, this setup is
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Figure 1: Differential testing of compilers: Detecting compiler bugs by looking for
disagreement of the results of running a program compiled by different compilers.
illustrated. With their implementation CSmith, the authors found and reported
hundreds of compiler bugs.
In a nutshell, differential testing solves the oracle problem of testing: Given
a test case, how do we know whether the test execution was successful or not. In
unit testing, developers often provide the oracle manually in terms of writing
assert statements. This is labor intensive and easy to get wrong, writing assertions
that are too weak to detect subtle incorrect behavior or that are wrong and
encode incorrect exceptions are not uncommon. With differential testing, we use
an existing implementation as the oracle. If the new implementation disagrees
with the existing one on a test input, we fail the test, without ever having to
write any manual assertions. Differential testing makes it much easier to write
test inputs, since we do not need to provide the expected results. Therefore it is
even possible to generate test inputs mechanically.
Differential testing has been used in many contexts for many years [Groce
et al., 2007; Lämmel and Schulte, 2006; McKeeman, 1998; Paleari et al., 2010;
Yang et al., 2011]. While very useful, it is only applicable in contexts where a
reference implementation exists (or multiple implementations to allow voting
to decide which implementation contains the bug). Interestingly, essentially all
variational analyses that I have been working on fulfill this criterion and are
thus amendable to differential testing.
In a nutshell, variational analyses (or variability-aware or family-based analy-
ses) work as follows: They perform some sort of analysis on entire configuration
spaces of highly-configurable systems. During the analyses they exploit the simi-
larities among different configurations and avoid the redundancies of analyzing
each configuration separately in a brute-force fashion. Since the configuration
space tends to grow exponentially with the number of configuration options,
a brute force analysis is infeasible for but the smallest systems; in contrast,
variational analyses have been shown to scale to huge configuration spaces with
hundreds or even thousands of configuration options (having configuration spaces
with more possible configurations than there are atoms in the universe). For
example, variational type checking encodes differences among configurations
compactly and checks types for all configurations through a SAT encoding [Czar-
necki and Pietroszek, 2006; Kästner et al., 2012a; Liebig et al., 2013; Thaker
et al., 2007]. Variational analyses have been explored for parsing, type checking,
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Figure 2: Variational analysis and brute-force execution of traditional analysis
yielding equivalent results.
data-flow analysis, model checking, and others—for an overview see a recent
survey [Thüm et al., 2014].
Differential testing is a good fit for variational analyses because most varia-
tional analyses aim to be sound and complete with regard to applying an existing
tool in a brute-force manner, as illustrated in Figure 2. Generally, variational
analyses aim to find all issues that could be found with existing approaches
and no additional ones, just much faster. Therefore, an existing nonvariational
reference implementation (the ‘conventional analysis’ arrow in Fig. 2) can pro-
vide the oracle when executed separately for each configuration. For example,
TypeChef aims to efficiently parse unpreprocessed C code with arbitrary prepro-
cessor directives while only rejecting input for those configurations for which a
traditional C parser would fail after preprocessing.
For differential testing, we simply exploit the equivalence between (a) a
variational analysis and (b) applying a traditional analysis in a brute-force fashion.
Where traditionally differential analysis would check two or more programs
performing the same task (e.g., compilers in Fig. 1), we compare the result of
the variational analysis with the outcome of the existing tool for individual
configurations. For small configuration spaces (say up to 10 boolean options), we
can apply the traditional analysis to every single configuration and thus establish
ground truth for the entire configuration space; for large configuration spaces we
can still use this to test select configurations.
While the idea seems obvious in retrospect and I hope that others have
used this form of testing for their variational analyses, I am not aware of earlier
systematic applications. This paper intends to spread the idea.
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3 Developing KConfigReader
KConfigReader parses the variability model of the Linux kernel, specified in the
domain-specific language of the kernel’s kconfig tool, and translates it into a large
propositional formula. The formula should describe exactly those configurations
that can be configured with kconfig. The formula can be used for many purposes;
for example, TypeChef uses it to avoid false positives by issuing a type error
only when it can occur in at least one valid configuration.
Honestly, I severely underestimated the involved complexity of the kconfig
configurator. There are several challenges in this translation. First, the semantics
of the kconfig language are not well described and the kconfig implementation
is the only reference (though core aspects have been formalized by She and
Berger [2010]). Second, the language includes features beyond propositional
logic, including 3-value logic for options and constraints over numeric options.
Third, kconfig’s configuration language is not fully declarative but follows an
imperative configuration mechanism in which the order of selecting options can
matter. Forth, kconfig changed slightly throughout the Linux kernel’s evolution,
requiring updates of the translation tool.
Although prior tools existed for this translation (see introduction), they
did not model kconfig’s semantics accurately enough to be used confidently in
the context of the analyses we do with TypeChef. TypeChef reported several
errors with constraints that should have been excluded by the variability model,
but due to inaccurate translation we spent much time trying to understand
bugs that could not be reproduced, because we could not create corresponding
configurations with kconfig. My goal with KConfigReader was to provide a
solution that was accurate and that I could understand and maintain as kconfig
evolves.
Crash course in kconfig. To understand how KConfigReader works and how
it can be tested, let us briefly introduce how kconfig works. The Linux kernel’s
kconfig language provides a mechanism to describe configuration spaces in a tex-
tual form in kconfig files. A kconfig file describes options and their dependencies,
as well as additional information about options, including textual explanations.
The kconfig tools read a kconfig file and present interactive configuration dialogs
to the user, who can select or deselect options as long as constraints are fulfilled
(multiple graphical and textual frontends exist). The selected configuration is
then written into a local file (.config) that is used by the build system during
the compilation process to include or exclude files or code fragments within files.
In Figure 3 (left), we illustrate a small example of a configuration file,
representing three Boolean configuration options A, B, and NOPROMT grouped
together in a choice to indicate that exactly one of them can be selected. Each
option that can be shown in an interactive dialog is represented by a textual
prompt and an optional help text. Defaults and dependencies can be described
with corresponding declarations.
The kconfig language has a number of nuances and quirks. Options without a
prompt are invisible and can never be changed by a user, but are automatically
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1 choice
2 prompt "choice prompt"
3
4 config A
5 boolean "A prompt"
6
7 config B
8 boolean "B prompt"
9 default n
10
11 config NOPROMPT
12 boolean
13 default y
14
15 endchoice
{} X
{A} X
{B} X
{NOPROMPT} X
{A,B} X
{A,NOPROMPT} X
{B,NOPROMPT} X
{A,B,NOPROMPT} X
Figure 3: Example test file and corresponding ground truth produced by kconfig.
computed based on dependencies and defaults. Beyond the shown boolean options,
also tristate options, string options, and numeric options are supported. For
tristate options, users can configure ‘y’ (selected), ‘m’ (compile as module), or
‘n’ (deselected), in which ‘compile as module’ is a specific feature in the Linux
build infrastructure to build a code unit as separate module rather than linking it
statically into the kernel. Numeric and string options are typically used for token
substitution in the source code (as C preprocessor macros). Boolean, tristate,
and numeric options can be used in complex constraints, such as “depends on
(IA64 || X86)&& USB_BUS=’m’&& CPU>3”. The interaction among these features is often
nontrivial [El-Sharkawy et al., 2015; She and Berger, 2010].
Differential testing. Knowing about the difficult corner cases and compli-
cated semantics of kconfig from prior debugging experience, I decided to use
differential testing during the development of KConfigReader from the very
beginning (in fact, the very first commit was mostly test infrastructure together
with a very simple translation). Differential testing in KConfigReader works as
follows, illustrated in Figure 4:
• A test file, such as the one shown in Figure 3 (left), tests some kconfig
snippet with up to 10 configuration options.
• KConfigReader translates the model into a propositional formula—in this
example NOPROMPT∧((A∧¬B)∨(¬A∧B)). Variables in this formula refer
to configuration options; given an assignment for a specific configuration,
the formula should evaluate to true if and only if the configuration is valid.
Details of the translation, and how some options may be encoded with
multiple variables, are described in the appendix.
• The test infrastructure collects all used options and builds a set of all
configurations (combinatorial explosion; up to 1024 for 10 boolean options)—
in this example the eight configurations shown in Figure 3 (right) for the 3
boolean options in our example.
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kconfigreader
Product Configuration
kconfig
((FEATURE_SH_IS_HUSH 
&& Y && X && 
!FEATURE_SH_IS_ASH && 
!FEATURE_SH_IS_NONE) ||  
…
.config
.config
.config
.config
{HUSH, X}
config X
bool “…"
default y
config Y
bool "…"
default n
depends on A
…
{} -> false
{X} -> true
{HUSH} -> true
{HUSH, X} -> true
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Figure 4: KConfigReader tested against a brute-force execution of kconfig itself.
• For each configuration, the test infrastructure creates a .config file in
kconfig’s format and runs kconfig’s conf command-line util as an oracle.
Without human interaction, the conf util reads a configuration and repairs
it if it is invalid. Thus, if the .config file remains unmodified the configura-
tion was valid, otherwise it was invalid. Using the conf util as oracle, we
can automatically build a truth table indicating which configurations are
valid as shown in Figure 3 (right)—it is not necessary to manually specify
the expected result for the test snippet.
• If the extracted propositional formula disagrees with any result from
the brute force execution of conf, that is, if evaluating the formula for
any configuration yields a result different from running conf on that
configuration, the test for the given snippet fails—in our example, the
test passes. Alternatively, it would be possible to translate the test results
(truth table) into a disjunction ((A ∧ ¬B ∧ NOPROMPT) ∨ (¬A ∧ B ∧
NOPROMPT)) and check equivalence of that ground-truth formula against
KConfigReader’s extracted formula with a SAT solver—the former strategy
makes it easier to provide meaningful error messages though.
While this differential testing strategy can obviously not be used to test the
entire kernel’s variability model or even any of its nontrivial submodels, it allows
us to write tests cheaply, without effort to also provide the correct answer. For
example, in the test in Figure 3, the expected answer is not entirely obvious—
option NOPROMPT is not visible during the configuration and does not count
toward the choice, but is always enabled—one could have easily provided the
expected test output incorrectly.
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Throughout the development of KConfigReader, I essentially performed test-
driven development, writing test cases for a particular feature of the kconfig
language first, observing what result kconfig would produce for all configurations
and then implementing that feature. The interactions of choices, dependencies,
tristate options, and invisible options turned out to be particularly tricky (see
appendix) and having an incrementally growing test suite of kconfig models
testing various corner cases provided immensely useful for regression testing. In
many cases, the implementation of one feature (say dependency propagation
among items within a choice) seemed plausible, but subtly broke other features.
It turned out that translating certain constructs accurately required sophisticated
encodings in propositional logic producing fairly big formulas. Due to all those
complicated cases, the translation code ended up far more complex than I initially
hoped, and I am pretty sure that I could not have developed and maintained it
without the test suite.
Generated and stolen test cases. Whereas the original work on differential
testing always combined an existing implementation as oracle with random test
case generation, I wrote most of my test cases manually.
I experimented with generating test cases, but found it difficult to write a
generator that would write interesting models that would contain complicated
corner cases of various options combined with dependencies, choices, and other
features. Writing more intelligent generators would be an interesting project in
its own right, but seemed way too time consuming for the benefit expected.
A much more interesting benefit was that I could easily steal test cases from
other projects. Other projects also independently thought about possible corner
cases and wrote several test cases; merging them was beneficial to ensure that
I did not miss any behavior covered by tests in existing tools. Specifically, I
included the test cases from the existing tools LVAT and Undertaker in my test
suite. Even though they manually specified the expected formulas that should
represent the result of analyzing test files, I could simply copy their kconfig files
without using their oracles or having to adopt anything else of their testing
infrastructure. In fact, I discovered that some of those test cases had incorrect
oracles in the original project and some tests could not even be executed with
the conf tool because they were not fully conforming to kconfig’s syntax.
After El-Sharkawy et al. [2015] performed their comparative study of kconfig
translation tools, I could also include their test cases, including one failing one
that revealed an error I could fix.1
At this point KConfigReader’s test suite contains 86 manually written test
cases, 21 test from LVAT, 32 test from undertaker, 15 test from El-Sharkawy et al.,
and 100 randomly generated tests. All these tests including their automatically
derived oracles could also easily be reused for testing other tools in the kconfig
context.
1Two other issues reported in that paper are corner cases explicitly not supported by the
translation discussed as limitations in the appendix.
8
4 Further Differentially-Tested
Variational Analyses
Colleagues and I have used differential testing for a number of other projects
on variational analyses. The idea is always the same: find a non-variational
application that can serve as an oracle when executing tests in a brute-force
fashion.
Variational Execution. We used differential testing systematically in much
of the development of our different attempts of variational execution [Meinicke
et al., 2016; Nguyen et al., 2014].2 The idea of variational execution is to execute a
test case with concrete values over a large configuration space, while preserving as
much sharing as possible to avoid redundant computations. Again, as illustrated
in Figure 2, the result of variational execution (i.e., failing or passing test cases
and even values of variables at any point in the execution) should be equivalent
to that of executing each configuration separately.
To test our variational execution engines (modified interpreters and a mech-
anism to rewrite bytecode), we used existing execution engines as oracle. For
example, for our PHP implementation, we simply use the original PHP inter-
preter without modifications as the oracle for testing our modified interpreter.
We developed a lightweight testing infrastructure, such that we could write PHP
code with special tokens (‘@A’, ‘@B’, and so forth) that represent configuration
options, such as the following:
1 $a = @A + 1;
2 if (@B) { $a = 5; }
3 while ($a < 10) { echo $a; $a++; }
The variational interpreter understands these tokens as conditional values repre-
senting both true and false in different configurations, whereas for the brute-force
execution they are replaced by ‘1’ or ‘0’ in a preprocessing step for each configu-
ration. The existing interpreter then simply executes the plain PHP code of each
configuration (with substituted configuration tokens) and records the printed
output from echo statements as oracle for that configuration. In addition to
writing our own tests, we use the existing test suite of the interpreters (without
variability) as additional test cases to ensure that we do not break existing
nonvariational behavior when modifying the interpreter.
In our Java versions, we pursued a very similar strategy but pushed the
comparison even further. Instead of just comparing whether a test case crashes
or what output it prints, we compare actual execution traces. For the oracle,
we use an instrumented but nonvariational execution in which we track which
bytecode instructions are executed in what sequence. We subsequently compare
this with the trace of bytecode instructions executed in the variational execution,
recorded with similar instrumentation. This way, we can use arbitrary snippets
2https://github.com/ckaestne/Varex2, https://github.com/chupanw/vbc, https://
github.com/meinicke/VarexJ
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of Java code as tests and ensure that they are executed in a variational fashion
without breaking Java’s semantics.
Finally, we started using the same testing infrastructure also for benchmark-
ing. Measuring both the execution time for the variational execution over all
configuration as well as the execution times for the brute-force execution, we
could track speedups of our tooling for evaluations and performance regression
testing.
TypeChef. Our TypeChef infrastructure should parse, type check, and further
analyze all compile-time variation of unpreprocessed C code [Kästner et al.,
2011, 2012b; Liebig et al., 2013]. That is, the result of running TypeChef should
be equivalent with the result of running a traditional type checker on every
configuration of the same code, produced by running the C preprocessor.
There are many steps in TypeChef that could have benefited from differential
testing. Unfortunately, TypeChef was not originally developed with differential
testing; we added differential testing only later and selectively. That is, it helped,
but we also missed a number of opportunities for differential testing:
• TypeChef’s lexer should produce a token stream that is equivalent with
the token stream produced by the C preprocessor on each configuration.
We initially developed TypeChef only with tests with handwritten oracles.
Even though it was easy in retrospect, we did not add a differential test
infrastructure for the lexer until very late, long after the initial releases.
The lack of better testing in early phases of the development caused many
problems, not least because we built on an open-source Java reimplementa-
tion of the C preprocessor that turned out to not fully implement the exact
semantics of the preprocessor. Interestingly, SuperC [Gazzillo and Grimm,
2012] was developed around the same time to solve the same problem
and we eventually used differential testing to compare the output of the
TypeChef lexer with that of the SuperC lexer (where admittedly essentially
all differences can be attributed to bugs in TypeChef).
• TypeChef’s parser should produce the same AST from unpreprocessed C
code as from parsing the preprocessed file in each configuration. Since we
developed our own AST, a direct comparison with ASTs produced by gcc
or other parsers would be not be particularly useful, but even comparing
the result of our own parser on preprocessed and unpreprocessed C code
could potentially reveal inconsistencies and bugs.
• TypeChef’s type checker should produce the same error messages for type
errors in unpreprocessed C code as a standard compiler would produce
when run on each preprocessed configuration separately. Unfortunately,
we never used differential testing for this purpose; it could probably have
saved a lot of effort and could have produced a more accurate type checker.
• Also other infrastructure built on TypeChef, including data-flow analy-
sis [Liebig et al., 2013], pointer analysis [Ferreira et al., 2016], and refac-
toring engines [Liebig et al., 2015; Medeiros et al., 2017] could likely have
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benefited from differential testing. Even if no nonvariational program could
produce the same output directly on preprocessed C code as oracle, we
could have compared whether the variational execution on unpreprocessed
C code was the same as the execution of the same tool on preprocessed C
code.
• For evaluating correctness of the refactoring engines Morpheus [Liebig
et al., 2015] and Colligens [Medeiros et al., 2017] for unpreprocessed code,
also a variant of differential testing was used. Instead of comparing a
variational with a nonvariational refactoring engine—for example, ensuring
that refactoring on unpreprocessed C code yields exactly the same result
as refactoring preprocessed code in each configuration—they exploit a
different mechanism as oracle that is common in testing refactoring en-
gines: The code before and after a refactoring should behave the same.
For example, Liebig et al. [2015] tested that a refactored program still
compiles in the same configurations it compiled before the refactoring and
that the test suite yields exactly the same results after refactoring than
before—both properties are tested on tests with small enough configura-
tions spaces by compiling the program and executing the test separately
for each configuration both before and after the refactoring. Medeiros et al.
[2017] pursued a similar strategy with generated tests. Note the difference
how KConfigReader was tested (cf. Fig. 4): For KConfigReader, a single
execution of a variational analysis was compared against the brute-force
execution of an existing tool, which established the oracle, whereas the
refactoring engines were tested by comparing a brute-force execution of
the original code against a brute-force execution of the refactored code.
This highlights once more the power of differential testing when suitable
oracles can be identified.
Overall, our experience shows that developing variational analyses is difficult,
but that it can often benefit from differential testing, not just for KConfigReader.
In cases where we did not use differential testing, as in most of TypeChef, I
regret it. Where we used it, as in variational execution, I believe it helped us
significantly. Once the traditional analysis that can be used to produce the oracle
is identified, the cost of setting up variational testing is typically relatively low.
The ease of writing tests that can even catch minor deviations without having
to provide the oracles is liberating.
5 Conclusion
Already when developing early versions of the TypeChef lexer and parser in
2010 my colleagues Sebastian Erdweg and Tillman Rendel suggested testing
TypeChef against a brute force approach. Unfortunately, I did not listen back
then, discouraged by the additional effort for writing what I now recognize to
be a differential testing infrastructure. It was over three years later, when I
first experienced the benefits of differential testing during the KConfigReader
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development. Looking back, I wish, I had recognized the benefits earlier and
I believe it would have helped us significantly with making TypeChef more
accurate and more compatible with existing tools. With the KConfigReader
experience, I am now convinced and have used differential testing in several
projects. I also have convinced collaborators to adopt differential testing as well.
This paper is my attempt to proselytize the rest of the community.
A KConfigReader: Propositional Encoding and
Limitations
In this appendix, I will provide some further details of how KConfigReader
works internally and what its limitations are. This is not intended to be a
complete description of how to translate the KConfigReader semantics, but
should illustrate the concepts used in the translation and the limitations of the
current implementations. It may help to understand why the transformation is
nontrivial and why differential testing was beneficial.
In general, KConfigReader parses a kconfig file and collects all options and
choices. It then creates a, typically very long, list of constraints expressed as
propositional formulas that describe which options can have which values and
which options can not be selected together. Most translations are local in that a
single configuration option can be translated into a small set of constraints, but
some constraints also require investigating multiple options or choices together.
The conjunction of all produced constraints forms the propositional kconfig
model. This model evaluates to true exactly for all assignments that correspond
to configurations that the kconfig model accepts. For reasoning with a SAT
solver, the model is translated into the common dimacs format.
In 2016, the x86 kconfig model of the Linux kernel had about 11,000 options.
KConfigReader produces about 70,000 constraints that translate to a 14mb
dimacs model with about 60,000 variables and 620,000 clauses.
Tristate options. Tristate options in kconfig represent a form of three-value
logic [She and Berger, 2010] that can be freely intermixed with boolean options.
KConfigReader models a tristate option o internally with three-value logic but
translates it to propositional logic using two mutually exclusive boolean variables
oy and om that indicate when option o has value ‘y ’ or ‘m’ (condition ¬oy∧¬om
indicates that o has value ‘n’). The same way, every expression over tristate
options can be modeled with two boolean variables for each expression, so that
expressions can now be translated as follows:
e = ¬a ey = ¬(ay ∨ am) em = am
e = a∧ b ey = ay ∧ by em = (ay ∨ am)∧ (by ∨ bm)∧ ¬(ay ∧ by)
e = a∨ b ey = ay ∨ by em = (am ∨ bm)∧ ¬ay ∧ ¬by
These translations can be uniformly applied also for combinations of boolean
and tristate options, where bm is always set to false for boolean options. As a
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further complication, a global MODULES option can control whether tristate
options are handled as boolean options for the entire configuration model.
Numeric and string options. Numeric and string options can have large or
even infinite domain, such that we do not want to model every possible value.
Instead, we model each relevant value we find in the kconfig model with a distinct
variable. Specifically, we collect all known values of numeric options specified
as defaults, in range constraints, or in literals used in comparisons with this
value. For string options, we collect all values in defaults. We then model each
known value with a boolean variable and create constraints to declare them
mutually exclusive. For example, for numeric option n with known values 0, 5, 100
represented by the mutually exclusive variables n0, n5, and n100. For constraints
that involve numeric values, we compute possible results for each known value
and replace the constraint with a boolean expression over the corresponding
variables. For example, the expression n<=5 is translated to a constraint n0∨n5.
Option dependencies. Options can declare dependencies on other options,
where dependencies are expressed as formulas over expressions, where expressions
can compare options to literals or other options. For example, config A boolean
depends on B=’n’|| C=’y’ can be translated into the constraint Ay ⇒ ¬(By∨Bm)∨
Cy. Dependencies for tristate options can be encoded as well with oy ⇒ d_y
and om ⇒ dy ∨ dm for option o and dependency d.
In addition, to dependencies declared on an option, reverse dependencies
of other options can affect an option. With a reverse dependency config O
select P if c, option O can activate option P under condition c. For the purpose
of establishing constraints, we handle such reverse dependencies essentially
equivalently to a declared dependency on target option (config P depends on O && c).
Due to technicalities of how reverse dependencies work, they are a known source
of inaccuracies as discussed below.
Invisible options. Options without a prompt are not accessible to users
during configuration, but are still influenced by defaults and dependencies. For
example, an invisible option can be declared to be selected by default, which is
changed if and only if a dependency restricts it. To further complicate translation,
whether an option has a prompt can depend on other options and a default value
can be computed from other options as well. If an option has multiple defaults,
the first that fulfills its dependencies will be chosen.
Translation of invisible options is not trivial but works roughly like this: A
boolean option O with a prompt under condition p and with the default ‘y ’ and
constraint c (config O boolean "prompt"if p default ’y’depends on c) will be translated
to a constraint ¬py ⇒ (cy ⇒ Oy)—that is, if there is no prompt then O will
always be selected unless the constraint c is not fulfilled. Nonboolean options
and multiple positive and negative defaults complicate the rules further.
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Choice. Choices as in Figure 3 allow users to select exactly one of the inner
options, or multiple ‘m’ values for a tristate choice. Intuitively, this is achieved
by constraints that require that at least one of the inner options is selected and
no two options are selected at the same time. Unfortunately, in combination with
tristate options and invisible options, the translation is far from obvious. For
example, options are not considered as children of a choice when they are invisible
(which may depend on other options), but when a invisible child is selected by
some constraint, also the outer choice must be selected; tristate options within a
boolean choice behave like boolean options; a tristate choice itself can be selected
as ‘y ’ or ‘m’ and behaves differently in either case, supporting either multiple
selections of inner options as ‘m’ or only a single option as ‘y ’. The specific
encodings can be found in the implementation, and many test cases illustrate
those corner cases.
Limitations. While KConfigReader is designed with the goal of accurately
translating all of kconfig, there are some limitations. Some of those limitations
account for special cases that I did not consider worth addressing, whereas others
are conceptual limitations that are difficult to overcome. With each limitation
come opportunities for further extensions.
First, the most severe inaccuracy relates to reverse dependencies (select
clauses). Reverse dependencies are executed whenever the corresponding option
is selected and may break other constraints in the process. In fact, they act as
imperative ‘if x gets selected, select y ’ logic, rather than a declarative constraints
‘if x is selected, y must be selected.’ As a consequence the order of selecting
options may matter. Kconfig issues a warning whenever a reverse dependency
violates other constraints, but allows the violation nonetheless. My understanding
is that this effect is not intentionally used and even actively discouraged, but
that it is rather a side effect of how kconfig is implemented. In fact, it would be
worth building an analysis on top of the models produced by KConfigReader
to point out the situations in which a reverse dependency can overwrite other
dependencies as a potential warning for the maintainers of the kconfig model.
Second, for numeric and string options, we collect all values that occur in
defaults and constraints, but do not model other values. While sufficient for some
purposes, our models cannot decide validity of configurations with other values
for these options, and we do not support range expressions over variable ranges.
While string options seem rarely relevant, as they never occur in constraints,
numeric options could be implemented using classic encodings with a variable
for each of their bits at the costs of larger constraints. Alternatively, one could
use a different target formalism and reason with SMT solvers rather than SAT
solvers.
Opportunities. I believe that accurate propositional models of kconfig pro-
duced by KConfigReader can be valuable for a large number of purposes, beyond
their current use to check the relevance of errors produced by TypeChef.
Most prominently, propositional models could be used in a configurator
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that would use the model and SAT solvers rather than the existing imperative
logic to improve the experience of users configuring their kconfig models. While
KConfigReader can provide the model, a large body of research on reasoning
about feature models can provide a path for building better configuration
tools, including tools that can help users with reconfiguration (‘What do I
need to change to enable this option?’ ) or can explain why certain options are
disabled [Batory, 2005; Benavides et al., 2010; Hubaux et al., 2012; Xiong et al.,
2012].
Furthermore, analyses can help maintainers of kconfig models to detect
inconsistencies. Classic analyses can detect dead and false optional options or un-
necessary constraints [Benavides et al., 2010], or could detect refactorings [Thüm
et al., 2009]. Beyond that, new analyses targeted specifically at kconfig issues
are possible: For example, it would likely be possible to develop an analysis to
detect where reverse dependencies could violate configuration constraints (see
limitations above) or detect corner cases with (tristate) choices that may lead to
surprising effects for users.
An accurate propositional model of a kconfig file can also be useful for tool
developers that analyze the Linux kernel. Beyond determining whether individual
configurations are valid (e.g., to filter warnings produced by an analysis tool),
such model can also be used to produce valid configurations for testing, either
randomly3 or in combination with other sampling strategies [Cohen et al., 2007;
Medeiros et al., 2016].
Finally, there are certainly also opportunities for further optimizations. For
example, KConfigReader produces a large propositional formula consisting of
thousands of constraints (for the Linux kernel) but maintains only weak trace-
ability to the origin of each constraint. For several analysis and debugging tasks
it might be worth to track specific constraints back to their sources in the kconfig
files. Similarly, precise handling of choices, invisible, and tristate options often
lead to large propositional constraints. This seems unavoidable unless imprecise
approximations are desired for faster reasoning. It could be worth providing both
an underapproximation and an overapproximation for situations where faster
reasoning is required but false positives or false negatives are acceptable.
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